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Dana Gold: This session is somewhat near and dear to my heart,
although somewhat provocative. This session is Protecting the Polity:
Strategiesfor Reform, and we frame this as additional strategies that are
actually percolating in a concrete way out in the real world, not just in
the world of academic theory, to promote citizen participation in a democracy that countenances corporate influence in the political process.
What we have learned today, to some extent, is that there is some
concern, acknowledged by both the audience's questions and the panelists, about the degree of corporate influence in democracy and how that
influence impacts our access to information in the political process.
Some people actually don't seem to think there is a problem; but we
wouldn't have anyone here at this conference if we at least didn't think
there was a problem and a need to at least look at the health of
democracy.
Again, for this session we will focus on several strategies that are
gaining concrete traction that seek-through very different tactics, as
well as philosophies-to foster a healthier democracy. Our speakers today are going to present a slice of some of those strategies that address
the corporate presence in our democracy. I will introduce them in turn as
they talk.
Our first speaker, Solange Bitol-Hansen, is the National Program
Director for Public Campaign, and she will talk about their very important work on clean elections and what it means to create a level playing
field in the political process. At Public Campaign, she is responsible for
federal and state campaigns and for strengthening public campaign work
with campaign reform allies nationally and across the country. Prior to
her work with Public Campaign, Ms. Bitol-Hansen spent five years as a
Director, Center on Corporations, Law and Society at Seattle University School of Law.
National Programs Director, Public Campaign.
Director, Center for Corporate Policy.
Co-Director, Center for Political Accountability.
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senior legislative advocate for SEIU, 1 focusing on federal legislation and
policy affecting immigrant workers and families. Before working at
SEIU, she was legislative counsel for Senator Arlen Specter, was legislative counsel for the ACLU on First Amendment free speech issues, and
was legislative counsel for the national office of the NAACP.
At this point, I'd like to turn the time over to Ms. Bitol-Hansen.
Thank you so much for joining us.
Solange Bitol-Hansen: Thank you. [Public Campaign] advocates
for full public financing of elections at all levels of government, largely
because of the disproportionate influence that corporate interests have on
privately funded political systems.
I want to thank Dana Gold for asking me to come here today. Last
night as I was in my hotel watching the local news, it was filled with political ads for the local races. There were some good ones, too. Of course,
doing the type of work that I do, I watched it intently and started thinking
about how much money is spent on political campaigns.
In the last election cycle, over $4 billion was spent on political
campaigns. Some of you may know, and some of my colleagues who
were speaking here earlier may know, that this summer my husband and
I had a baby, Max. He's four months old, and I started thinking about
how expensive elections are going to be when and if Max decides to run
for office. So, I decided that I'd like to use time here today to kick-off his
exploratory committee. Everyone can take out your checkbooks and
make it out to "Friends of Max Campaign." We'd appreciate it.
Yesterday, I took Max to the Pike Place Market and saw that next
year the Market will celebrate its hundredth year anniversary. Of course,
centennial celebrations are a big deal, and this year marks several important 100 year anniversaries. In addition to the Pike Place Public Market,
there's the Portland Rose Festival and the 100 year anniversary of
Hersheypark in Hershey, Pennsylvania, if there are any chocolate lovers
in the house today. The park will celebrate by introducing a new edition
to its water park ride.
2
Finally, there's the hundredth birthday of the 1907 Tillman Act,
the federal law that banned corporations from contributing directly to the
federal election. The 1907 Tillman Act, championed by President Teddy
Roosevelt, limited corporations and national banks from giving money
directly to candidates. Roosevelt had previously called for such a measure in his 1905 State of the Union speech, saying that all contributions by

1. Service Employees International Union.
2. Tillman Act of 1907, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1907) (repealed 1994).
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corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose
should be prohibited by law.
Unlike support for the Rose Festival, the Pike Place Market, or the
Hersheypark hundredth birthday celebrations, it's unlikely there'll be any
great fanfare for the anniversary of the Tillman Act. That's because at
the start, the Act's provisions did not have an enormous effect at the
time, and, of course, it still doesn't 100 years later.
Corporations are still prohibited from making direct contributions
to candidates. Corporate and business influence in elections, however, is
at an all-time high. Political action committees and individuals working
for these companies are the dominant source of money for political campaigns. Taking a look at some of the statistics from the last political cycle, some $4 billion was spent, as mentioned earlier, in 2004. The average cost of a House seat was $1.2 million, a comparative bargain to that
of a Senate seat for $7.2 million. Candidates who do not have massive
personal fortunes that they are willing to spend on their own races must
collect this money from wealthy corporate interests that have it to give
away.
With seventeen days left in this election, some campaigns have already topped 2004 races in terms of fundraising. Democrat senator
Hilary Clinton has already raised more than $47 million, more than the
entire amount raised in the 2004 New York Senate race, and dwarfing
the $4 million raised by her Republican opponent, whoever that happens
to be this week.
Locally, Maria Cantwell has raised over $17 million, more than
twice the amount raised by Michael McGavick, her Republican opponent, who's raised a little over $8 million dollars. In total, more than $27
million has been raised for the Washington Senate race, fourth overall on
the list of top ten Senate races this year according to the Center for
Responsive Politics.
Business interests are dominating contributions in the 2006 elections, giving $817 million, again according to the Center for Responsive
Politics, which is about $18 for every $1 contributed by labor unions.
The list of top contributors in this year's race is dominated by business
interests, including the National Association of Realtors, Goldman
Sachs, the American Bankers Association, and the United Parcel Service
(UPS).
Why does it matter that candidates are dependant on business interests for money to fuel their political ambitions? It matters because these
interests are contributing and want a return on their investment, and all
too often they get it. In contrast, ordinary people like you and me don't
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have the spare cash in our budgets to make sure their representatives in
Congress and the White House are putting their interests first.
Consider UPS as an example. The company's executives and political action committee, which have contributed nearly $20 million to
federal campaigns since 1989, nearly two thirds of that amount to Republicans, was one of the business community's staunchest opponents to a
Clinton-era federal rule to prevent injuries to workers, known as the
"Rule of Ergonomics." When I was at SEIU, I worked a lot on this particular rule. One of George W. Bush's first acts in office was to sign
legislation that rescinded that regulation. At that time, some 20,480
workers at UPS missed a day or more of work annually because of back,
leg, and other injuries, the sort of thing that the regulation was designed
to prevent.
The American Bankers Association, the leading voice for commercial banks nationwide, was at the forefront of the efforts to dismantle the
Glass-Steagall Act, 3 the critical Depression-era law that for close to six
decades kept the banking, securities, and insurance businesses separate
from each other. These interests got what they wanted when Congress
approved the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act.4 Since then
we've seen a series of Wall Street scandals, such as the implosion of
Worldcom, which Eliot Spitzer blamed on the deregulation feature in
that law.
So what do we do about this problem? My colleagues and I at Public Campaign believe that the solution is not necessarily more regulation
of campaign spending. Instead, it's important to provide an alternative
way for people to run for office without having to rely on business interests to fund their campaigns.
Full public financing of elections, or "clean elections," give
candidates this opportunity. Clean elections systems typically work by
offering candidates the choice of qualifying for public funding if they
demonstrate grassroots support by raising a set number of small contributions; in most cases $5 per voter. They must also promise to take no
more private contributions and to abide by strict spending limits. Because this system is totally voluntary, it passes muster with the Supreme
Court campaign finance rulings. Candidates must rely on a large number
of people for very small contributions instead of receiving large contributions from an elite few. Qualified candidates receive an equal and set
amount from a clean elections campaign fund to run their campaigns. If
they face a privately funded opponent who raises more money than they
3. Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
4. Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 338 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
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have been given, they can then qualify for additional funds up to a set
limit. These additional funds are also available if candidates face outside
spending opposing them; that is, independent expenditures.
Clean elections are beyond theory and well into practice. Clean
elections laws are on the books in seven states: Arizona, Connecticut,
Maine for all state elections; North Carolina for judicial appellate elections; New Mexico for the Public Regulations Commission; Vermont for
Governor and Lieutenant Governor races; and New Jersey where there
was a legislative pilot program in effect in 2005 that's up for renewal in
2007 and has widespread support in the legislature.
In addition, two cities have also adopted full public financing of
elections: Portland, Oregon and Albuquerque, New Mexico. In Arizona
and Maine, where clean elections have been in place for statewide races
since 2000, we've seen an increase in the diversity of candidates running
for office and competitive seats. The system is also quite popular. Seventy-eight percent of the members of the Maine legislature used clean
elections in their races. In Arizona, ten out of eleven statewide officials
ran using this system, and currently Janet Napolitano, the Governor, is
running clean.
Meanwhile, the reelection rate for incumbents in Maine and Arizona dropped in both 2000 and 2004, according to researchers at the
University of Wisconsin. While this trend cannot entirely be explained
by the existence of clean elections, nevertheless the researchers concluded that there is no question that public funding programs have increased the pool of candidates willing and able to run for state legislative
office. The fact is most pronounced for challengers, who are far more
likely than incumbents to accept public funding. Public funding appears
to have increased the likelihood that an incumbent will have a
competitive race.
Recent polling by Lake Research Partners and Bell Weather Research 5 shows that clean elections are also popular with the electorate.
Three out of four voters support a voluntary system of publicly-funded
campaigns. This support crosses all party lines and is strong across
demographics and regional groups.
Moreover, clean elections are spreading. For instance, in the House
of Representatives, John Tierney of Massachusetts and Raul Grijalva of
Arizona are each sponsors of HR 3099,6 which establishes public financing for clean elections for House races. A similar bill is being worked on
in the Senate and is expected to be introduced if they come back in for a

5. See http://www.campaignmoney.org/polling (last visited May 18, 2007).
6. Clean Money, Clean Elections Act of 2007, H.R. 1614, 109th Cong. (2005).
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proforma session after the elections, or if not then in the 110th Congress
in January. Another example of how clean elections are spreading is
found in California, where voters will have the chance to vote for Proposition 89, 7 the clean money and fair elections initiatives, which would
establish public funding of elections for all statewide and legislative
races in the state. Efforts are under way in dozens of states to bring clean
elections to state and local races. Just today we had a discussion at lunch
where we talked about funding of judicial elections here in Washington
state because of the amount of money that had to be raised and spent for
the last cycle.
In the wake of political scandals radiating from convicted lobbyist
Jack Abramoff, citizens' groups are also working to get candidates for
Congress in this year's elections on record for full public financing of
elections. As of today, 351 candidates for Congress have signed the
Voters First Pledge, 8 which shows their support for clean elections-style
system of congressional races, as well as several important lobbying reforms. Among the signers are over seventy current members of Congress, and you can find out more information about the Voters First
Pledge at www.VotersFirstPledge.org. Finding a way for qualified candidates to run for federal office without needing to resort to collecting
from special interests would take power away from the Jack Abramoffs
of Washington and put it back in the hands of voters where it belongs.
The 1907 ban on corporate contributions was a good start, as were
the many campaign finance reforms that followed. But to truly bring balance and fairness to the political system, we need to go far beyond a
formal ban on corporate contributions to federal campaigns as well as
contribution limits and disclosure laws. Clean elections are a practical,
proven way to make politics about the people.
Dana Gold: Thank you. What is interesting is that the clean
elections strategy, as far as I know, has avoided conflict with First
Amendment jurisprudence, but addresses some of the problems we've
been talking about today. It will be interesting at the end of this session
to discuss what is hopeful about some of these strategies but also what
some of the limitations and challenges to them are.
Next we have Charlie Cray who is going to talk about a range of
strategies both at the grassroots level and beyond. Some strategies address the issues that Professor Adam Winkler discussed this morning
about the jurisprudential move that equates corporations with persons,
7. For more information about Proposition 89, see http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/vig_06/
general_06/pdf/proposition 89/entireprop89.pdf (last visited May 18, 2007).
8. For more information on the Voters First Pledge, see http://www.campaignmoney.org/
votersfirstpledge (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
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and how local communities are dealing with the perceived problems that
personhood status creates for corporate influence in democracy. He will
also discuss other efforts to counter corporate voice in nearly every
aspect of culture.
Charlie Cray is the Director for the Center for Corporate Policy and
a policy analyst there. He's also the coeditor of HalliburtonWatch.org.
He is a coauthor of The People's Business: Controlling Corporations
and Restoring Democracy,9 as well as an article that was published in the
Seattle Journal for Social Justice at a conference that Charlie
participated with us back in April of 2005.10 So thank you, Charlie, for
joining us today.
Charlie Cray: Thanks, Dana. I want to set up my talk by reminding
you a little bit about the political and legal history of the corporate rights
movement that has been quite aggressive over the last few decades. As
we've heard from many people throughout this conference, corporations
are increasingly invoking the First Amendment to defend commercial
and political speech, but also to dissolve local, state, and federal restrictions on their activities. And in some respects, we need to look at this as
the result of an ideological movement that accelerated in the early '70s
when the United States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) asked Lewis
Powell to write a strategic memo to help corporate America maintain its
power.
If you don't know what I'm referring to, search on Google for
"Powell Memorandum" and read it carefully. What Louis Powell wrote
was transformed by the Chamber and the corporate right wing, particularly the Scaife, Olin, Bradley, Smith Richardson, Coors and other foundations, into a decades-long agenda. Powell started by suggesting that
"the free enterprise system is under attack," and corporate executives
needed to organize a concerted response in the courts, on the campuses,
and in the media. We talked a lot about those arenas here today. That's
not surprising.
After the Powell Memo was written, these large foundations set up
dozens of legal foundations, including the Pacific Legal Foundation, and
handed stacks of cash over to groups like the Heritage Foundation, which
virtually functions as Bush's backbench today. One particular legal
foundation, the most aggressive and perhaps the craziest, is the

9. LEE DRUTMAN & CHARLIE CRAY, THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS: CONTROLLING CORPORATIONS
AND RESTORING DEMOCRACY (2004).

10. Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman, Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 307 (2005).
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Washington Legal Foundation 1" based in Washington, D.C. Let's review
some of the actions that the Washington Legal Foundation has taken with
regards to corporate speech.
They've used the First Amendment to get a District Court to strike
down FDA restrictions on promoting off-label uses of approved drugs.
They opposed the FDA's trans-fat labeling regulations. Of course, they
backed Nike in Kasky. 12 They supported breast implant manufacturers'
and asbestos makers' rights to advertise during trials. They argued that
restrictions on point-of-sale advertising, warning labels and disclosures
sought by the federal government, the FTC and the FDA, violated big
tobacco's First Amendment rights. They argued that the bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 13 which we heard a little bit about earlier, encroaches
on the First Amendment rights of speech and association.
They opposed the test to require GMO labeling. They opposed
European standards on advertising. They opposed city ordinances banning tobacco and alcohol advertising. They opposed attempts in Congress to eliminate tax deductions for tobacco and alcohol advertising.
They opposed attempts to regulate product placement in movies. They
opposed the ban on Joe Camel, or Joe Chemo as we like to call him.
They supported the phone carriers' right to use customers' business
records without prior consent, and it goes on and on and on.
The Washington Legal Foundation's Richard Simms once said, "I
look at us as the bearers of the torch of the civil rights movement. I see
us as the successors to Martin Luther King and Thurgood Marshall." And
the Chairman of the Washington Legal Foundation, Dan Popeo, added,
"I like to think of us as a small business version of the ACLU, only our
stress is on economic civil liberties." Small business, indeed. The funders
include Exxon/Mobil, 3M, Caterpillar, Chase, Phillip Morris, Citicorp,
Sprint, Bristol-Meyers, and Warner Lambert.
I want to talk a little bit about some speech issues in both the areas
of commercial speech and political speech that are getting some attention, at least from activists. I'm an activist, and I'm not an attorney. I
guess the last time I was in Seattle was when some friends of mine shut
down the WTO because they were trying to pass a universal global investor rights agreement at the exclusion of all other rights for people, and
that was an excellent moment. Being back here now reminds me that
corporate speech rights are part of this larger corporate agenda that
confronts us.
11. For more information on the Washington Legal Foundation, see http://www.wlf.org (last
visited Apr. 7, 2007).
12. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
13. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441 (2002).
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In the area of commercial speech, you've heard a lot already about
advertising tobacco and liquor. Consumer drug ads are another example
that I want to touch upon today. First, step back from the legal issues and
remember that the amounts of advertising that we've seen in our society
has grown tremendously. Expressed in 2004 dollars, according to Advertising Age, 14 in 1900 it was just $9 billion. By 1976 it was $89 billion in
the United States; by 2000, $236 billion; by 2004, $266 billion. Jeff
Chester said earlier that the amount is expected to rise to around $275
billion this year. The result is that we have a completely commercialized
culture. We're basically colonized. That is the word I like to use because
it reflects the fact that we think of ourselves as consumers rather than as
citizens, let alone as neighbors or spiritual beings.
The average American sees over 2,000 messages a day. What effect
does it have? Try this: Ask your kids how many brands of candy or other
foods they can name. Give them a minute to write as many as they can
down on paper. Then tell them they have another minute to write down
as many species that are native to their state as they can think of. Then
compare the two and ask yourself what happens when corporate speech
dominates the discourse?
We see a diminishment of the public spirit everywhere in this society. It's not just the visual pollution and the crowding out of noncommercial messages and the chaos in the public sphere. It's also the
elimination of the public sphere entirely that we're talking about.
The average American sees forty-seven hours of television per
week. In the "marketplace of ideas" we hear the term "listener" bandied
about, especially in legal debates. But who, exactly, are these listeners?
Are they consumers? Are they just consumers, or are they also citizens?
Isn't that sort of like what the law does to people when they participate in
the corporate system where you're only an investor or employee or customer? In Dan Greenwood's papers on corporate speech, he addresses
this question of the role of human beings within a certain kind of system.
I think what happens is that our ability to think as citizens is
fundamentally circumscribed.
We cede a lot of ground when we talk about these things as consumer questions rather than questions about self-governance. Speech is a
question about whether we want a society that allows us to construct the
architecture of public discourse to ensure democracy. Such as the media.
Such as the prevalence of commercial advertising (or not) in public

14. Mercedes M. Cardona, Ad-Spending Soothsayers Optimistic on Year Ahead, ADVERTISING
AGE, Dec. 15, 2003.
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spaces. Such as elections. Political scientist
Carl Boggs gets into this
15
question in his book, The End of Politics.
As a result of ubiquitous commercial speech we find ourselves conditioned around patterns of unnecessary and wasteful consumption. So
just exactly how is advertising a beneficial form of speech? We should
go back and read John Kenneth Galbraith, who said that the individual is
increasingly subordinate to the goals of the producing organization.16 If
that's the case, who really benefits? Does commercial speech benefit the
consumer? Or does it really benefit the speaker?
What are the consequences for things like public health? In the tobacco cases, this is a big issue. Lawrence Gostin, one of the leading figures in public health law and policy said to the American Public Health
Association:
A different First Amendment theory should recognize the importance of population health and the low value of corporate speech. In
particular, a future court should consider the low information value
of tobacco advertising . . . unlawful practice of targeting minors,
and magnitude of the social harms . . . to the extent that commercial

speech becomes assimilated into traditional political and social
speech, it could become a potent engine for government
deregulation. 17
The default position, therefore, should not be that all speech is
good, or that corporations are like you and me, or that we should cede the
notion that they should enjoy the rights of persons unless there is an explicit reason not to, because it is often the case that we can't foresee the
harm. In public health regulation we have the precautionary principle,
which suggests that if an action or policy might cause severe or irreversible harm to the public, in the absence of a scientific consensus that harm
would not ensue, the burden of proof falls on those who would advocate
taking the action. Without it, new technologies can be introduced, and it
will be a long time before we can document the adverse impacts enough
to meet the unbelievably high standards of proof required to restrict
them. As legal theorists, what do you think is the ethical standard?
Should the default be to lean toward protecting corporate speech, or do
we think it's important to recognize that other principles and societal
values should take precedence, such as public health?
We create corporations, so there shouldn't be any automatic assumption that they have rights. This was discussed earlier: chartering is a
15. CARL BOGGS, THE END OF POLITICS (2000).
16. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).

17. Lawrence 0. Gostin, CorporateSpeech and the Constitution: the Deregulationof Tobacco
Advertising, 92 AMER. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 352-55 (March 2002).
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privilege and not a right, although the assumption is that the system of
law has evolved to the point where that may no longer be true-I don't
know the law as well as most of you. But I do know that it's still possible
for the people to exercise their sovereign authority over corporations. In
New York, the Attorney General revoked the charters of the Tobacco
Institute and Council for Tobacco Research, 18 which were incorporated
to provide truthful information about the effects of smoking on public
health. The Attorney General described their work as "a pack of lies."
Certainly corporations themselves don't always act as if more speech is
better, at least when it comes to their employees. We know that from
Larry Soley's work, that they restrain the speech of workers in the work
place. Union organizers are very familiar with the consequences.
The example I want to highlight today is direct-to-consumer drug
advertising. The United States and New Zealand are the only countries to
allow these [forms of advertising]. Between 1996 and 2004, direct-toconsumer drug ads, DTC ads, rose over 500% in the United States. For
instance, in 1994, $265 million was spent on advertising pharmaceutical
drugs to consumers. The same amount of money was spent in the first
five months of 2004 on erectile dysfunction drugs alone. One can argue
that maybe this is a good thing, that maybe it's developed an environment where men are less embarrassed to talk about a health condition.
But that's certainly not the reason the drug industry has done this.
There's a Kaiser Family Foundation study that concluded that each dollar
spent on DTC advertising in 2000 yielded four dollars in sales.19
The ultimate goal of DTC advertising was revealed in a candid
moment by two direct-to-consumer drug advertising executives at FCB
Healthworks, who wrote: "The ultimate goal of DTC advertising is to
stimulate consumers to ask their doctors
about the advertised drug and
20
prescription.,
the
get
hopefully,
then,
DTC ads glamorize and normalize the use of prescription medications. Unlike tobacco, you are talking about a product that is not introduced directly to the market. You are creating an emotional bond
between the consumer and the product that will, in essence, interfere
with the relationship the patient has with the person who prescribes the
drug: their doctor. This is similar to the marketing strategy that
McDonald's uses: convince the kids to pester their parents. Patients go
18. Tobacco Institute, Hearing on Petition to Dissolve CTR, Tobacco Indus. Litig. Reporter
(June 26, 1998). See also City of New York v. Tobacco Institute, Inc., 1997 WL 760502 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
19. THE HENRY J.

KAISER FAMILY

FOUNDATION,

IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER

(June 2003).
20. D. John Loden and Caroline Schooler, How to Make DTC Advertising Work Harder,Med.
Mktg. and Media, April 1, 1998, at 38-43.
ADVERTISING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 7
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and pester their doctors so that they can get medications because they
have developed an emotional bond with the fantasy they see on TV,
where people are leading great lives after taking certain drugs.
There is a phenomenon that public health experts call "disease
mongering." This is defined as prescribing medications for normal behavior, and basically turning that normal behavior into a disease-like social anxiety disorder. For instance, what we used to call being shy is now
termed as generalized anxiety disorder. And there are others, like
"restless leg syndrome." In selling sickness, the world's pharmaceutical
companies are turning us into patients. You could say pharmaceutical
companies are searching for new disorders based on extensive analysis of
unexploited market opportunities. The coming years will bear greater
witness to the corporate creation of disease.
Is that a good public health policy? Is that how we want to make
our drug policies? Vioxx example is a good example. In 2000, Advertising Age named Vioxx one of the top 100 mega brands, and Merck spent
$160 million in 2000 and $135 million in 2001 on one of the largest DTC
ad campaigns ever, on Vioxx. FDA researcher David Graham told the
Multinational Monitor that there were approximately 100,000 heart
21
attack cases associated with the use of Vioxx.
There is also a group called Commercial Alert.22 They have thirtynine groups organized to endorse what they call the Public Health Protection Act, which puts restraints on DTC ads. There are 211 medical
school professors who endorse a statement that is on their Web site.
Another type of corporate speech increasingly being resisted is
internet advertising. Adware is a growing phenomenon. Twelve and a
half billion dollars were spent on internet ads in 2005. A lot of this advertising was placed on your computer without your consent. Over 80%
of U.S. computers have these kinds of programs. There are laws in
places, like in the state of Utah, that restrict Adware. 23 One of the marketing groups took Utah to court to overturn its Spyware Control Act,
24
arguing that the law violated their First Amendment rights.
Finally, I wanted to also mention an example of activism in the area
of political speech. You may have already heard about the "Measure T"
campaign in Humboldt County. Voters in the county passed that
21. Interview with David Graham, Blowing the Whistle on the FDA, Multinational Monitor

(Dec. 2004), http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2004/122004/interview-graham.html.
22. For more information on Commercial Alert, see http://stopdrugads.org/leam more.html.
23. Spyware Control Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-101 et seq.
24. Brad Slutsky and Sheila Baran, Just a Tad Intrusive? Spyware and the Internet, 14 Bus.
LAW TODAY 2 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2004-11-12/baran.shtml (dis-

cussing spyware, state efforts to limit use of spyware, and WhenU.com, Inc.'s success in challenging
Utah's Spyware Control Act).
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referendum in June by a 55% majority. You can get all the details from
VoteLocalControl.org.25 Basically, the law prohibits non-local corporations from making direct or indirect contributions and independent expenditures in all elections within the jurisdiction of Humboldt County,
including candidate campaigns, initiatives, referendums and recalls. The
activists who organized the campaign for Measure T would not be surprised if the ordinance is challenged in court, but the circumstances are
different than those in the Bellotti case,26 which may make a difference.
For instance, it would not be as hard to establish that corporations have
distorted the political process. WalMart, for example, spent $250,000 to
try to change a local zoning law in 1999, and the Madison Corporation
spent $300,000 in 2004 to try to recall the local district attorney after he
was in office for just three months.
I do not think that there was that kind of a history in the Bellotti
case. It will be an interesting one to watch as it gets challenged in the
courts. Thanks.
Dana Gold: Thanks, Charlie. I definitely encourage you all to ask
more questions about that. What I think is interesting is the contrast between the commercial speech strategies you talked about, which seek to
address a symptom of corporate involvement in the public fora, specifically the deluge of corporate advertising, as compared to the "Prop T"
initiative in Humboldt County, which seeks to address the many problems caused by corporate influence in politics at their root by prohibiting
all corporate contributions in elections. Both kinds of strategies are
important.
Our next speaker, Bruce Freed, presents an innovative and concrete
strategy for dealing with corporate accountability and the role of corporations in our society by using the language of corporate law, such as risk,
fiduciary duty, and accountability to shareholders, to change corporate
behavior and ideally minimize their influence in the political process.
Bruce Freed is the codirector of the Center for Political Accountability, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization created to bring transparency and accountability to corporate political spending. From 1998 to
2004, he wrote a column on business and politics for The Hill, a newspaper that covers Congress. He was the first to report on the implications of
the absence of transparency and accountability in corporate soft money
spending. He commented on business and politics on PRI's Marketplace,
and he managed his own strategic public affairs firm. Previously, he
served for a decade as chief investigator for the U.S. Senate Banking
25. http://votelocalcontrol.org (last visited May 18, 2007).
26. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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Committee, staff director of a House subcommittee, and a senior aide
and strategist to members of the House leadership. He began his career
as a journalist, so it's interesting to see the arc of his career channeled in
not such a predictable way, but a natural arc. Mr. Freed, thank you for
joining us.
Bruce Freed: Thank you very much, Dana. It is a pleasure to be
with all of you this afternoon to deal with an issue that is very important
to our democracy and to our society today. That issue is corporate power,
how one addresses it, how one creates countervailing checks to corporate
power, and how one develops innovative strategies to do that. The work
of the Center for Political Accountability and the effort that we have
been leading for the past three years addresses the issue of corporate
political spending with company money.
We are not dealing with PAC money. We are talking about treasury
funds, shareholder money, whatever you call it, that companies are
pumping into politics. What we are dealing with is money that is having
a direct impact on public policymaking, on government decisionmaking,
and on the political process.
Let me give you some background on the Center. What we decided
to do when we created the Center three years ago was to take a practical,
results-oriented approach. Our approach was to look at corporate political spending from the standpoint of the risk it posed to shareholder value.
Dana talked about our using the language of the companies. We felt it
was very important that when you address companies and try to get them
to deal with this issue, that a framework be created in which the management would understand it, in which shareholders would understand
this, and in which we could talk to the media and get through to our target audiences. Our audiences include directors, senior executives, CEOs,
investment analysts, and others who would be addressing the broad issue
of what companies are doing with their political spending.
It is a very interesting issue because there is a serious problem with
corporate political spending today. That spending is not disclosed. When
a company makes a soft money contribution, that contribution is not disclosed by the contributor; it is disclosed by the recipient. That means that
you have to cut into the middle to find out where recipient money is
coming from and where it is going.
Soft money was limited with the passage of BCRA, the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002.27 What that did was to prohibit soft
money contributions to political parties and to political action committees of elected officials, also known as leadership PACs. Up until 2002,
27. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441 (2002).
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elected officials such as Representative Tom Delay of Texas, Senator
Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas,
Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, and Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota had their own leadership PACs. Quite a bit of soft money, including
corporate soft money, was going into these groups. However, that money
dropped off with the passage of BCRA.
What we found was that corporate money was being shifted. It is a
shift that had begun much earlier, around the mid-90s, but accelerated
after the passage of BCRA. The money was going to trade associations.
Trade associations were emerging as very active, independent political
groups. They were pursuing agendas that went beyond what one would
assume to be in the interest of their corporate members. Indeed, they
,were getting involved in social issues and getting involved with issues
that companies had deliberately and consciously made an effort to stay
away from.
The strategy that the Center developed was to use the shareholder
resolution. We drafted a shareholder resolution that called on companies
to disclose and require board oversight of their soft money contributions.
This is what we call Resolution 1. It also called for companies to identify
28
the corporate officers involved in the decisions on the contributions. In
the 2004 proxy season, our resolution was filed by three institutional
investors at 23 companies.
The resolution passed muster at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although the resolution was challenged, the challenges,
known as "no actions," were rejected by the SEC staff. By the end of the
2004 proxy season, we found that our resolution cracked 10% of the vote
at twelve of the twenty-three companies where it was filed, and the average vote was 9.1% for the first year. That was a tremendous response for
a first-time resolution. It was categorized by Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), the big proxy voting advisory service, as a socially
responsible resolution.2 9
What happened is that we caught the attention of companies. By the
end of December 2004, the first company came to us and said, "We want
to agree to disclose and require board oversight of our soft money contributions." The company was Morgan Stanley, so we dubbed what they
agreed to the "Morgan Stanley standard." Very quickly thereafter, in
2005, we began getting responses from more companies; there was beginning to be a cascade effect: first Johnson & Johnson, and then in the
28. Resolution

1, available at http://www.politicalaccountability.net/content.asp?contentid

=429 (last visited May 18, 2007).
29. Conversation between Bruce Freed, Co-Director, Center for Political Accountability, and
senior officials of Institutional Shareholder Services (Summer 2004).
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fall Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. We began getting more companies, and
within eighteen months we had twelve leading companies that had
agreed to disclose and require board oversight of their soft money
contributions.
We went from three institutional investors that filed for the 2004
season to twelve for 2005 and seventeen for 2006. What we found was
that the institutional investors-socially responsible mutual funds, public
employee pension funds, union pension funds, and religious orders-were strongly committed. Their strategy, in many instances, was
to use the resolution to engage companies. The strategy we follow is to
engage, and I use the word engage very deliberately because, as I said,
we are looking for results. For us, receiving a high vote on our resolution
is very nice. It makes you feel good, but does it bring about change? No.
Engaging a company and getting it to agree to disclose and require board
oversight is the change that we are looking for.
What we have been looking to do is build up momentum where you
get more and more companies agreeing to disclosure and where the
proxy voting advisory services began recommending for the resolution.
ISS is the leading one. There are several others. They advise institutional
investors on how to vote their proxies, and we want to get them to view
this resolution as a new corporate governance standard. We did that with
ISS where, after initially dismissing the resolution by the 2006 proxy
season, they changed their policy and began recommending for it on a
company-by-company basis. They recommended for the resolution at
two-thirds of the companies where they reviewed it in 2006.
We are looking to create this as a corporate governance standard
because, in the end, we want companies to disclose and require board
oversight. When I talk about board oversight, I mean that board oversight
is the other shoe that needs to drop because it means accountability.
When companies spend their money politically, there need to be directors asking why they are doing this. Disclosure allows directors to take a
hard look at how their company spends money politically. In many cases,
they do not know what their companies are doing with their political
money. They do not know what companies are doing in trade
associations.
We found that out in a survey that we did. In January of 2005, Tom
Hamburger of the Los Angeles Times interviewed John Engler, the new
President of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). Engler
told Hamburger about a multimillion dollar campaign that NAM was
planning to mount on behalf of the Bush judicial nominees. These were
controversial appellate nominees who had been blocked in the Senate.
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The Center decided to write to 750 directors of sixty companies that
were on NAM's board. We did a survey asking them whether they had
been informed of and had approved of NAM's use of their company's
money for this purpose. We found in many instances that it is very difficult to get through to directors, even though companies in their proxy
statements provide an address to contact them. But we did receive some
responses. One was from Southern Company, the big utility, saying that
it told NAM not to use its money for that purpose. GE did the same
thing. Then we got a letter from American Electric Power. They told us
that it was their policy not to inform the board about what they do with
trade associations-a very important piece of intelligence. We then got
letters from two directors of Coming. One of the senior vice presidents
said that they had looked at the NAM invoice, and they were satisfied,
although the invoice just said dues payment, period, and nothing else.
But what we then discovered was quite interesting. A friend, who
headed up the Washington office of a major company, faxed me a memo
that the senior vice president for communications at NAM sent out. It
turned out that our letter prompted quite a few companies to query NAM
about their plans. It turned out in this memo that NAM retreated because
of the Center's query to the companies. Because of the questions they
were getting from the companies, NAM found that they could not go
ahead and do this.
This shows the type of pressure that we are building on companies
to have the internal dialogues on their political spending and its consequences. We found that this is very effective. Early on we put out a press
release, I think it was back in April of 2004 just before the Union Pacific
annual meeting, saying that Union Pacific money ended up at the
Traditional Values Coalition.
One of the strategies that we have used is what we call "conflicts
and contradictions," where we take a look at company values. We use
company statements that are on their web sites to examine what they
state their values to be. We can see their personnel and diversity policies.
How do they treat their gay employees? What do they say about diversity? We are broadening it now to include issues like global warming.
What is the company's position on global warming? Then we go and we
take a look at where their political money has ended up.
In the case of Union Pacific in 2004, the company made a contribution to a 527,30 and in turn, that 527 made a contribution to The
30. IRS § 527 defines a relevant entity as "[a]n organization that is created to receive and disburse funds to influence or attempt to influence the nomination, election, appointment or defeat of
candidates for public office." I.R.C. § 527 (2006). See generally http://www.gnossos.com/webhelp/
What is a 527_Organization_.htm.
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Traditional Values Coalition in southern California. This is a vitriolic
homophobic group. When we made the announcement that their money
ended up at that group, I received a call from a Union Pacific spokesperson who was quite angry. But the fact is they could not argue with us
because the company's money did end up there. We had the same
situation with PepsiCo with a contribution it made to Senator Sam
Brownback's Restore America PAC in 2000. That contribution ended up
going to Kansans for Life and the Kansas Christian Coalition.
What all of this shows is that when you use disclosure, and then
you apply it and you seek to develop accountability, you can achieve serious results. You can begin to get companies to address the
consequences of their contributions. This is a case of using incremental
change to achieve systemic change. When Dana Gold was talking about
changing corporate behavior, that is what our ultimate goal is. We are
looking at a three or five year time frame to do that.
One thing I want to mention is that we are opening up a new directors program. As more companies agree to disclosure and board oversight, we have to make sure that directors know what board oversight
means; what their fiduciary responsibility is; what questions they need to
ask; what information they need to get from their companies; and what to
do at board meetings. That is where you can begin to change company
behavior. We have developed a relationship with The Wharton School at
the University of Pennsylvania to begin to move on these efforts.
I wanted to present this to you because this is a practical approach
that is achieving results. It's an approach that offers a way to address the
issue of how to use shareholder power to create countervailing power to
corporate power. Thank you.
Dana Gold: I would like to open this up to questions, but one of the
things I think is so interesting is this concept of using fiduciary duty, or
using the language of risk and the duties of directors to engage in protecting shareholders and the interests of the corporation, to affect corporate behavior. Part of the power of that is related to another thing we
have been talking about today, which is how image has become the value
of the corporation. To the extent that advertising and image are really
part of the very intangible but very real value of the corporation, it is in
part what gives access to using those existing tools to counterbalance
internally that image because it's a reputational concern that they have
with transparency.
Bruce Freed: When you take a look at the Harris Interactive survey
on corporate reputations that are run in the Wall Street Journal each
February, we found that to be a tremendous tool to use with companies.
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Dana Gold: What is interesting, too, is the extent that you're trying
to educate directors about the kind of information that they need. This is
the post-Enron shift where rather than looking at your short-term quarterly reports, you are looking at more long-term trends, strategy, and different things of where the value of the company is found.
I find this whole panel both incredibly hopeful in terms of very real
strategies that are being used both within the existing status quo-and
the tools that exist within the structures that we have now-as well as
some aspirational models. At the same time, I also think there are inherent limitations to each of the strategies. I would love to open it up for
questions, because I think these are all real things that we can dig into.
Audience Participant Lisa Danetz: I have somewhat interrelated
questions for Bruce Freed. I am interested in hearing about your approach, but what struck me when you were speaking is that a lot of the
success that it seems you have had has been from your intervention with
the company. First, are you confident that once a policy is implemented
it will do something without your being actively involved? Second, how
do you make it self-perpetuating so that it is not that the Center for
Political Accountability has to be involved constantly with every
corporation.
Bruce Freed: It is a very good question that you are asking. This is
why I developed the directors program; it is a change in terms of how
directors are beginning to approach their responsibility. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is very3 helpful there because it has increased the
responsibilities of directors. 1
We are just at the beginning. We have gotten the attention of companies, especially when you take a look at our strategy of going to media
that reaches corporate audiences. For us, the New York Times, Financial
Times, Wall Street Journal, Business Week and Fortune are very important because they validate what we are doing. It gets the message
through; but there is still a great deal of work to do. The work with the
Wharton School is going to be important here. This is very interesting
because we are working with the director of the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research. That gives us access to directors, to CEOs, and to
senior executives.
One of the things that I have found when I have been in dialogues
with companies is that you cannot come in and attack them. If you attack
them, they are turned off. They will not deal with you. We need companies to agree to the disclosure and board oversight. We need this to
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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become a corporate governance standard. We have to focus on accountability, fiduciary responsibility, and educating directors. It will take a
while to achieve that, but I think that it will become a norm and eventually become embedded in the corporate culture so that political spending
becomes a red flag to shareholders and companies become much more
sensitive to its consequences.
Audience Participant: I am interested in the dialogue between
Bruce Freed and Charlie Cray. Bruce Freed appears to be an incrementalist with the view that for every little baby step you take, you are going to
have six or seven giant steps sideways. Mr. Cray's approach is to do incremental steps straightforward. I am trying to figure out which is the
better approach to actually achieve the objectives of the panelists, bearing in mind that all of us have a finite life, and some of the problems we
are addressing will also be finite, perhaps causing us to have finite lives.
Charlie Cray: Well, I think that's an existential question that everyone answers for themselves. I often hear activists criticize strategies
like the one adopted by the Center for Political Accountability as being
incremental, and I don't agree. The strategies are often synergistic. The
ultimate goal is democratic control of corporations, and part of that
would have to be done through the inside of the process, which has to be
done methodically (what some would call "incrementally") to be
effective; but much of it has to be done, and where we've atrophied, is
externally, which is where my presentation largely focuses.
Bruce Freed: Let me add some information about our Resolution
2, which calls on companies to disclose not only their soft money contributions, but also their donations to trade associations and other tax exempt organizations that are used for political purposes. 32 If you get the
companies to disclose this money, companies will then need to address
why they are doing this. We're beginning to have discussions with some
major companies on the disclosure of their trade association spending.
This is exciting because you have companies who are finding out they
don't know about the extent of their trade organization memberships.
They don't know about the extent of the spending. They don't know
what percentage of their payments to the trade association is really not
tax deductible.
One company I've been dealing with has said, "2.9 percent." "How
did you get that?" "It's a ballpark figure." This company said, "We want
to thank you for raising this." This ballpark figure comes from the tax
and finance department that should know exactly. If we can make

32. Jeanne Cummings, Investors Seek Clarity on Campaign Giving, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2006,
at A4.
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headway with several companies on this, it creates the type of beachhead
from which you can fan out from and deal with other companies. But just
imagine when a trade association gets a letter from a major corporate
member saying, "We'd like to know what percentage of our payment is
being used for political purposes. And by the way, what are the political
purposes?"
That could have a salutary effect. It's an incremental change, but in
the end we know what the systemic change is.
Charlie Cray: Another example is the debate over proxy access
and the ability of shareholders to nominate their own candidates for the
board. The leading opposition to this comes from the Chamber and the
Business Roundtable. They are using company money (arguably shareholder money) through dues to lobby against the interests of the
shareholders themselves.
So what's the best way to address that, if you care about shareholder rights? I would argue that for those of us in the public interest
community, the best way is to organize large pension funds and for others, particularly labor who is interested in this, to nominate their own
candidates for the board so that the board has someone who represents
their interests. It won't necessarily change some of the other internal corporate governance dynamics, but having someone like that as an internal
watchdog would be very useful. This strategy leads in to others, or it
could be a linchpin to remove some of the barriers to some of these other
internal reforms in corporate governance that activists, shareholders, and
others have been seeking for some time.
Audience Participant Kent Greenfield: My question is for Solange
Bitol-Hansen. I'm from Massachusetts, and our experience with clean
elections was both very optimistic and horrible. The population passed a
very good clean elections law some time ago, which included a requirement of the legislature to fund it. And the legislature kept refusing to
fund it even after the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) of Massachusetts
said they had to fund it. The legislature still said, no, we're not going to
fund it. In fact, then the SJC instituted an order selling property that
belonged to the legislature in order to fund it, and that caused the
legislature to rescind the law that had been adopted by resolution among
the population; and now the issue is dead.
So it seems to me that as an intellectual matter, clean elections are a
no-brainer, and that they're clearly a good step and positive. But at the
same time, it's hard to envision a broad-based political strategy where
the people really, really care about that as their one issue. And, even if
you do have broad-based political movement behind it, it's hard to envision the people in power now being behind it enough to get it through.
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Solange E. Bitol-Hansen: There is a broad base of people being
excited about clean elections. Last year there was a huge groundswell of
support for the Connecticut Clean Elections Law. It was brought on
through years of activism, grassroots canvassing, and good old-fashioned
campaigning. A Democratic legislature passed the bill and the Republican governor signed it into law. Additionally, in the next legislative session the legislature fixed the technical amendments necessary to make
the law go forward because it had a poison pill that was inserted into it at
the last minute.
Portland, Oregon also passed their clean, voter-run elections law
last year. Albuquerque, New Mexico passed one as well. Around the
country, there is more movement, including in the state of Washington.
The Clean Elections Bill 33 made it through one chamber and got to another chamber, but then ran out of time. Judicial clean elections bills are
also gaining traction because of the rising and staggering costs that are
being spent on judicial elections.
Bruce Freed: But with the judicial elections, you've got the
problem of the corruption of justice then, too.
Solange E. Bitol-Hansen: Let me go back to my Connecticut
example. It didn't hurt that a governor was in jail at the time. The Clean
Elections Law was passed. In North Carolina there is phenomenal support. Why? Because the House Speaker is under investigation for an
online internet gambling scandal and handing out checks on the House
floor.
The individual political people that aren't in support of clean elections want to protect their incumbent, and they're afraid of having to run
another system where they may have six, seven, eight challengers. Other
opponents of clean elections want to protect systems like what was revealed in the Abramoff scandal. People were accepting contributions and
doing things that they lawfully aren't supposed to be doing.
I think there is a grass roots movement all around the country to
support clean elections. There is a student organization called
Democracy Matters, and they have a great groundswell of student activists. Democracy Matters did big things last year to bring about public
financing in Rhode Island, and took over a town hall meeting and a legislative hearing. There are these grassroots type movements, we just
sometimes don't hear it in mainstream media.
Audience Participant: This is directed to Bruce Freed. I think any
time you can open up corporations, any veil you can partially pull back,
ultimately accrues to the public benefit. The more we know about what
33. See supra note 8.
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corporations do, the better shot we have of making them responsive to
US.
I just wanted to pose a hypothetical where the disclosure might not
necessarily be beneficial, at least not in the short run. Let's say we find
out that you force the directors of Boeing to discover where the PAC
money is going, and they are sending it to some white supremacist group
or gay-bashing group. And the directors decide they don't make money
off that type of contribution, so they pull the money out and redirect it.
Well, where do they make money? They make money from guys who
want to spend a lot of money on weapons and maybe invade countries
and increase demand, so they shift the money to these causes. So, that
would get more shareholder value, but probably wouldn't be responsible
in the way that most of us think of making corporations responsible.
Bruce Freed: Your example is a very interesting one and related to
34 and Hidden Rivers.3 5
two of the Center's reports, the Green Canary
Hidden Rivers dealt with trade association spending. In Hidden Rivers,
we focused on state judicial elections because the Chamber of Commerce
is very active there. Another group, The American Tort Reform Association, serves as a conduit for corporate money to state judicial races in
Ohio, Illinois, West Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas. We used these states as case studies. What we wanted to show in
Hidden Rivers is that it's virtually impossible to find out how much
money is involved and where the money is really going. Each of these
states was like an island in the Pacific Ocean, where the mountain is
mostly under water and hidden from view.
There was an interesting race in Mississippi in 2004 involving a
candidate named Samac Richardson who was challenging an incumbent
justice who happened to be black. Richardson was a lower court judge.
He ran what the Jackson Mississippi Clarion-Ledger called a racist campaign. 36 Two columnists at the paper said that Richardson was playing
the race card and that he was using racial code words. 37 In Hidden Rivers, we identified 18 companies that gave directly or indirectly to Samac
Richardson.38 This was a case where companies weren't asking trade
associations what they were doing with the corporation's money.
34. CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE GREEN CANARY: ALERTING SHAREHOLDERS
AND

PROTECTING

THEIR

INVESTMENTS

(2005),

http://www.politicalaccountability.net/files/

GreenCanaryFinalA.pdf.
35. CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, HIDDEN RIVERS: HOW TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
CONCEAL CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING, ITS THREAT TO COMPANIES, AND WHAT
SHAREHOLDERS CAN DO (2006), http://www.politicalaccountability.net/files/HR06.pdf.

36. Id. at 38.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 38-41.
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This example gets to the issue of reputation that Dana Gold raised,
and it puts in the forefront the issue of accountability. When talking
about companies diverting money, companies say if you block the
money off in one area, then they will send it elsewhere. I think what will
happen is that companies and directors will start questioning what value
they get for that money.
An upcoming report by the Center on corporate codes of conduct
will describe how the codes of conduct of companies regulate political
spending. A survey we conducted of the S&P 100 found that 81 of the
100 companies did address corporate political spending in their code of
conduct, but it was in a vague and cursory manner. We are using this
report to present an 11 point model code on political spending that the
Center and its partners developed. We will also be working with our institutional investor partners to get companies to adopt the model code.
Audience Participant: How do we watchdog these good practices
that you're having some success with? One idea is that government
hasn't ceded all of their oversight of big companies, and the government
still requires charters. Companies historically had difficulties getting
chartered and sometimes they were time-limited. But now, I'm not sure
getting chartered is so difficult. Charlie Cray, you suggested that possibly
we can require that companies be truthful in a charter. Maybe we could
require some accountability in charters. I don't see any think tanks or
anybody else talking about how to reinforce the charter process, and I
wondered if anybody had anything to say about that.
Charlie Cray: Chartering was a process that originally started as an
instrument of democratic control over business. State legislatures gave
out charters and put specific limits on many things in the charters. And
through a process that Adam Winkler described earlier, the charter has
eroded as a tool of control over corporations. Can we get that control
back? Maybe. That's why federal chartering has been brought up periodically as a tool; however, I don't see any easy answers to this question
right now.
Chartering has been raised periodically as an issue in American history, especially during moments of popular outrage about corporate
power. I think Teddy Roosevelt proposed federal chartering, and the proposal was even passed in separate sessions by the Senate and the House
during his term. But it never became law. In the mid-1970s, after Watergate and other revelations about corporate corruption, Ralph Nader and
his associates wrote a book called Taming the Giant Corporation39 in
which they pointed out the potential for and the potential problems with
39. RALPH NADER, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (Norton 1976).
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this chartering solution. For instance, in an age of global corporations,
what do you do about forum shopping? Just as Rockefeller moved from
Ohio to New Jersey in the late 1800s, you could conceivably see someone move to the Caymans if we really got a tough chartering system.
Nader and his coauthors suggested that you could address the issue by
still requiring companies to obtain a federal charter to do business anywhere in the United States if they are above a certain level of capitalization, regardless of where the company is actually incorporated. Professor
Kent Greenfield also address these issues in his scholarship, including
his forthcoming book.4 °

Dual chartering wouldn't be required for every business. For instance, you wouldn't require it of the smaller entrepreneurs, but it would
be required for multinationals who operate all over. If the multinationals
want to do business in the United States or in a particular state, they
would effectively have to have a local license. I don't know all the issues
that might arise under this system, but it's something that at least in this
country we need a debate about.
But I agree that the current chartering process is basically a rubber
stamp. One extreme example of the ease of chartering occurred on the
eve of the Phillip Morris shareholders' meeting a few years ago. A group
of activists decided to point this out by incorporating a company whose
express purpose was to kill 400,000 people a year through the distribution of tobacco products. The company was called License to Kill, Inc.,
and the state of Virginia rubberstamped the papers without hesitation,
and the company was legally in business.
Audience Participant David Skover: It seems to me that the shareholder resolution is an approach best suited for corporate spending for
social issues that are truly collateral to the profit maximization interests
of that corporation. Thus, to use the earlier example, when it's bad business to discriminate, then the corporate board response is likely to be
more favorable if it turns out that in looking at where the soft money is
going, to organizations that support discrimination, such as white
supremacists or are anti-gay groups. But where the money is given, for
example, by big oil companies to the trade associations that fight
environmental regulations, it is possible that this shareholder resolution
would be less effective.
Bruce Freed: Well, when you're dealing with the trade associations, it is Resolution 2. But the point that you're raising is very interesting because a growing number of companies are finding that it's

40. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2007).
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important to their corporate reputation, and also to some extent to their
business model, to tip their hat to environmental issues. It's good for
their reputation and their business to be green-tinged.4'
Resolution 2 addresses the broad issue of political spending by
companies because once you begin to see what that spending is, and once
directors begin to see that, you can start raising questions. In many cases,
you don't know what the broad range of the spending is. These resolutions are windows into this spending. They are a wedge that we're using
that will help find other interesting things that can be helpful.
But what is most helpful is to take the dialogue into the company,
into the boardroom, to senior management, and to educate them so they
begin to look at political spending from the standpoint of risk.
David Skover: In The Death of Discourse, Ronald Collins and I extensively support the notion of commercialization of our speech culture
and the commoditization of our identities, and we posited that Americans
have increasingly embraced a consumer democracy rather than a citizen
democracy. Now, that said, I think the issue really is where the fingers of
blame are to be pointed. Most activists, including I would imagine the
three of you, are more likely to point the finger of blame right squarely
into the face of the corporation.
But now my question to you, Charlie Cray: is it possible that like
the citizenry of the brave new world, we Americans have come to love
our "soma" such that, in essence, when we ask who is the enemy here in
the changing from citizen democracy to consumer democracy, the real
answer might be that the enemy is us? That we are the enemy?
Charlie Cray: I totally agree, and that's why I used the word
colonization earlier, and not lightly, because it starts with a psychosocial
understanding of what it's done to us. How do we participate in our
society? What does it mean apart from leaving out people who are
indoctrinated?
On the question of civic participation, or what it means to be a citizen: we've lost a lot of understanding and a lot of room to organize. For
instance, I talk to activist friends who run corporate campaigns, who too
often rely upon damaging the brand, market chain analysis, and
shareholder resolutions. There is no public policy component to those
campaigns.
Another example where I think we've been convinced in a bad way
to not function properly in our role as citizens is the Abramoff scandal.
What a lot of people are probably thinking is that after twenty years of
having been told that "government is the problem," the corruption in
41. Green-tinged, meaning to support environmental causes in appearance only.

2007]

Protecting the Polity: Strategiesfor Reform

1017

Washington just proves that yes, government is the problem. Who benefits from that? I don't see Grover Norquist 42 closing up shop as a result
of this. It's a self-perpetuating kind of thing. We've got to break out of
that, and I think one of the best ways to do it is through the kind of
organizing that the people in Humboldt County did through a process of
education. There are these things called Democracy Schools that a group
called the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund and the Program on Corporations, Law and Democracy have organized.
At these schools they go all the way back, inviting us to educate
ourselves about the history of the Constitution. It's phenomenal what
comes out of that, including things like the Measure T campaign in
Humboldt County. That's very much like the role of The Highlander Institute in Tennessee during the civil rights movement. I think that's the
model. I think people want to go back to fundamental principles like our
right to organize ourselves as a democratic society. But how do we do it?
That's a tough question that you get a chance to entertain at these
schools. We have to decolonize our own thinking so that we can see
clearly what we're after, and that's why it's important to learn the history
and peel off the layers so we can see clearly.
Audience Participant: A lot of those things define what the public
domain is; that is, that part that stays public no matter what the private
contract is. Pennsylvania, where I used to practice, had life insurance
companies, and you know how they used to operate in the colonial days.
These companies were formed before the United States existed, and so
there was no regulation of them. Pennsylvania came into being, the country came into being, they had a commonwealth, but there were no contract laws. There was no constitution. So Pennsylvania passed a law saying that the sale of insurance was a matter of the public health and welfare and then imposed its police power and said, if you fail to make the
payment every year, in effect as a license, then you lose your prenational priority. And a lot of companies lost their pre-national priority.
All of a sudden they found themselves regulated. By the same definition,
people used to hunt at will, and then that became regulated.
It seems to me one of the problems that you're getting at is what is
public welfare that gets to be regulated no matter what contract is in
effect? What things cannot be sold? What things cannot be made the subject of a grant? And it seems to me that the public mood is coming
around to beginning to say and redefine exactly what that is.
42. Conservative activist and president of Americans for Tax Reform, (in)famous for the quip,
"Idon't want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into
See http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub."
php?storyld=l 123439 (last visited May 18, 2007).
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Charlie Cray: An example that many people understand is the
fight against the privatization of water, which didn't start here. I think
really the biggest battle was in Bolivia where there was actually a very
bloody battle against the subsidiary of Bechtel, who was operating with
the support of the World Bank. And, it comes around again to the WTO
protest in Seattle, the instruments of creating markets out of what many
people consider to be essential rights.
In South Africa, activists are pushing for de-commodification of
electricity because they consider it an essential service, not a commodity,
which was, of course, what it was in California with Enron and others
manipulating the market. So I think that you're right, and that's where a
lot of organizing campaigns are structured or the principles are grounded.
Some of these things should remain in the public domain. Look to
Capitalism 3.0 by Peter Barnes, where he talks about the commons and
how the notion of the commons is extremely important to our survival.43
Dana Gold: I'm sorry I can't take any more questions. Let's thank
our panel, and thanks so much to all of you for coming.

43. PETER BARNES, CAPITALISM 3.0: A GUIDE TO RECLAIMING THE COMMONS (2006).

